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LAW SCHOOL LEMONADE 
Or Can You Turn External Pressures into Educational 
Advantages? 
By Elizabeth Handsley, Gary Davis and Mark Israel ∗ 
In a context of ever-dwindling resources, this article encourages 
legal academics to seek innovative strategies to safeguard the 
integrity of our mission. Teaching innovation funding, more 
effective use of students as a resource and a willingness to be 
flexible when it comes to content coverage are suggested as 
means to maintain, or even improve, not just teaching quality but 
morale among academic staff. The article challenges the notion 
that smaller class sizes are necessary for higher teaching quality, 
suggesting the alternative of collaborative learning groups to 
keep students engaged and to encourage deep and independent 
approaches to learning. Collaborative learning provides 
additional benefits in freeing up staff time and engaging us in the 
educational process at a level more commensurate with our skills 
and expertise. 
If life gives you lemons, make lemonade. (Unknown) 
The lemons of the title to this article are the familiar factors that have made life 
more difficult, complex and stressful1 for legal academics over recent years. 
Changes to policy by successive federal Liberal and Labor governments, and 
especially cuts to government funding of higher education, have required legal 
academics to try harder to please larger, more diverse and more demanding 
groups of students. Our scope for judgment about what and how we teach is 
being circumscribed by quasi-market pressures. These may undermine 
important educational goals.2 Our commitment to traditional university values 
like free intellectual inquiry is being made more difficult to sustain.3 
All in all, this represents a sizeable bowl of lemons. We could toss them 
back and attempt to carry on, in an environment of despair. At best, this might 
lead to a situation where even change for the better has only been ‘uneven, 
                                                          
∗ School of Law, Flinders University. The preparation of this article was supported 
by funding from the Flinders University Teaching and Learning Innovation Grant 
Scheme. The authors thank Peta Stead for her able research assistance. We 
acknowledge also the important contributions of the other Constitutional Law 
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teamwork project, particularly in their willingness to review content coverage. 
1 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 35. 
2 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), p 554. 
3 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 43; Thornton (2004), pp 494–95, 501. 
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often temporary, and has struggled entirely to transcend the traditional model 
of legal education.’4 Or, as we prefer, we could take the view that the only 
credible solution is to find sugar, water and a squeezer and turn the lemons into 
lemonade.  
This article will develop some ideas on how one might find the right 
equipment and ingredients in the ‘new’ teaching environment. We describe 
how the new emphasis on teaching quality, and increased pressures to achieve 
teaching efficiency, paradoxically have stimulated a return to the kind of 
student-centred learning favoured by the Pearce Report in 1987. In fact, the 
invention born of necessity in this field might even have inspired a firmer and 
more reliable basis for this kind of teaching. In addition, student-centred 
learning can conserve the time and energy of academic staff that has been 
drained by changes in the environment. In this sense, it can have an industrial 
effect rather similar to that of a refreshing drink on a hot day. 
In developing our case, we will make particular reference to an 
innovation introduced at Flinders University in 2002.5 We do so in order to 
explore the very process of innovation in legal education. Rather than seeing 
innovation as a mere technical fix, we consider it within the social, economic 
and political, as well as educational, contexts of legal education. Accordingly, 
we begin with a contextual outlook. 
The Context of Legal Education 
Relations with Students 
It is trite to say that in law schools we are being required to do more with less. 
We are expected to be more ‘accountable’ in both a qualitative and a 
quantitative sense — that is, we are being watched more intently, in relation to 
more fields than previously. A notable addition has been the field of teaching. 
Student evaluations have taken on a significance that could only have been 
imagined by the previous generation.6 In addition, increasing financial 
impositions on students, exacerbated by the rhetoric and implications of the 
‘new knowledge economy’,7 have led to a demanding consumer mentality on 
their part, very much oriented towards ‘credentialism’8 and ‘careerism’.9As 
Vivienne Brand notes, the ‘key, and apparently contradictory, themes’ of 
increasing vocationalism and broadening curriculum to cater to students with 
                                                          
4 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), p 537. 
5 See Israel, Handsley and Davis (2004). 
6 For evidence, see Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), pp 428–35; Coaldrake and 
Stedman (1998), pp 81–82. 
7 See Thornton (2004), pp 482–84. 
8 Thornton (2004), p 484. 
9 See, for example, James (2004), p 51. 
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diverse employment futures have had implicit in them ‘the need to cater to 
student career intentions’.10 
Paradoxically, moves to improve teaching standards might encounter 
resistance from students imbued with this mentality, as they are more likely to 
take a narrow, black-letter view of what they ‘need’ from a legal education,11 
as well as the skills and information for which they are prepared to pay.12 
Speaking of similar developments in the United Kingdom, Abdul Paliwala 
relates the consumerist mentality to anti-intellectualism.13 
Support exists for the view that students ‘frame their expectations of, and 
satisfaction with, their [legal education] in terms of their hopes and fears about 
post-graduation employment’.14 New teaching methods15 — which many 
academics believe will improve, intensify and deepen the learning experience16 
— can be resented by many students as ‘not providing them with the 
information they needed to understand and pass subjects’.17 There are, for 
instance, students who see small-group discussions, at least in some subjects, 
as a poor attempt to ‘teach’ them by compelling them to interact with other 
students who have an equally poor understanding of the subject: ‘We’re all at 
sea before we go in and when we come out. How can students teach other 
students about contracts? It’s stupid.’18 Such perceptions go hand in hand with 
a belief that the methods in question interfere with students’ preparation for the 
world of work.19 
Meanwhile, the reorganisation of funding in the late 1980s led to an 
explosion of new law schools around Australia and a corresponding explosion 
in numbers of law students through the 1990s. Law schools numbered 12 in 
1987 and grew to 28 by 1998.20 Student numbers nationwide increased by 60.7 
                                                          
10 Brand (1999), p 121. See also Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 36 (noting a tendency 
‘to undermine traditional teacher–student relationships’). This trend has been 
noted in the United Kingdom as well: see Johnstone (1995). 
11 This is an attitude possibly enhanced by the conventional structure of a law course, 
with its heavy compulsory component (lately reinforced by the ‘Priestley 
requirements’ (see below)) leading, it has been argued, to the student perspective 
that law is ‘necessarily constituted by these things … [that] it is about substance 
… not critique’: see Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 90. 
12 Brand (1999), p 138. 
13 Paliwala (2002), p 188. 
14 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 275. 
15 Identified by students as ‘something other than the straight lecture format’: 
Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 271. 
16 On the question of what many legal academics are attempting to accomplish as 
teachers see Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), pp 282–86. 
17 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 271. 
18 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 271. 
19 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 275. 
20 Simmonds (1998), pp 56–57; the 29th, at Edith Cowan University, came on the 
scene in 2005. 
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per cent per cent between 1988 and 1992.21 One result of these developments 
is that law teachers are dealing with a more diverse group of students than ever 
before. To use South Australia as an example, Bradsen and Farrington found in 
1986 that, at the University of Adelaide — then the only law school in the state 
— ‘upper-income family [law] students … outnumber[ed] the low-income 
family students by three to one’.22 At Flinders University in 2003, by contrast, 
only 45 per cent of law students lived in suburbs falling in the top 25 per cent 
of the city’s population for socio-economic status.23 Students from the middle 
50 per cent of suburbs constituted 38 per cent and those from the lowest 25 per 
cent made up 5 per cent.24 
Noting in 1998 the growth in numbers of mature-age students, Coaldrake 
and Stedman went on to report that: 
There are nowadays more women students, students from different 
ethnic and cultural backgrounds, overseas students studying in Australia 
before returning to their home countries, students with disabilities, 
students with lower levels of English proficiency, and so on.25 
Moreover, as the law school explosion was fuelled by a perception that law 
could be taught cheaply,26 most of us have found ourselves teaching larger 
classes.27 This was in spite of the strong recommendation of the 1987 
discipline review (Pearce Report) in favour of small class sizes.28 
Varnava and Burridge suggest that increases in student numbers without 
corresponding increases in resources ‘may be inimical to some of the social 
objectives of law — the ideals of justice and empowerment’.29 This is because 
the management of such numbers makes it difficult for law teachers to move 
away from traditional authoritarian modes of teaching, thereby compromising 
our ability to transmit messages about ‘consideration of others who lack 
knowledge’.30 
                                                          
21 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 21. This figure compares with a 33.9 per cent 
increase in all fields over the same period. 
22 Bradsen and Farrington (1986), p 31. A study by Jack Goldring of seven law 
schools in southeastern Australia at about the same time found that ‘an 
overwhelming proportion of law students come from families where the status of 
one or more parents is relatively high’: Goldring (1986). 
23 Department of Education Science and Training (2003). 
24 Department of Education Science and Training (2003). The figures were pushed 
down further if the whole of Australia was used as the comparison (44 per cent 
high, 43 per cent medium and 12 per cent low). 
25 Coaldrake and Stedman (1998), p 78. 
26 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), pp 20–21, 32; Simmonds (1998), p 66; McInnis and 
Marginson (1994), p 233; Keyes and Johnstone (2004), pp 539, 557. 
27 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), pp 325–31. 
28 Pearce et al (1987), pp 159–60. 
29 Varnava and Burridge (2002), p 13. 
30 Varnava and Burridge (2002), p 12. 
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Relations with the Profession 
The pressures are also felt in our relations with the profession.31 The influence 
of the profession over law school curricula has its historical basis in control 
over admission to practice.32 This culminated in the so-called ‘Priestley 11’, 
the ‘areas of knowledge’ adopted by law schools as required parts of the 
curriculum. Adoption followed pressure exerted by the 1992 conclusions of a 
‘Consultative Committee of State and Territory Law Admitting Authorities’ 
(chaired by Justice Priestley). New pressures have flowed from the rising need 
to raise funds from elsewhere than government.33 Many law schools have 
looked to law firms for the support needed to maintain and enhance their 
programs and activities. These can be relatively small — sponsoring academic 
prizes and competitions34 — or quite substantial: 
In 1991, the Sydney Law School secured $500,000 from Sydney law 
firm Allen Allen & Hemsley in return for naming rights for the 
School’s library; also on offer were rights to name lecture halls and 
professorial chairs.35 
While it may be going too far to assert a loss of academic independence 
as a result of these relationships,36 they must enhance the opportunity for the 
practising profession to exert influence.37 It would be surprising if there were 
no impact at all on our willingness to change our activities in any way that 
risked discomfiting our benefactors. Such an impact would be found 
particularly in the areas of curriculum and teaching delivery. The involvement 
of practitioners and judges in teaching, and in course planning, monitoring, 
advice and review, is now common.38 It is difficult to imagine any Australian 
law school implementing and sustaining changes that might be perceived in the 
profession as compromising the ‘relevance’ of our degrees.39 Indeed, a law 
                                                          
31 It does need to be noted, however, that ‘the profession’ is not monolithic and, 
importantly, those practitioners and judges who have had a hand in monitoring 
course content in law schools ‘have typically not been representative of the 
profession as a whole’: Brand (1999), p 112. 
32 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 19. 
33 See Brand (1999), pp 118, 120; James (2004), p 58; Keyes and Johnstone (2004), 
p 557. 
34 James (2004), p 58 
35 Brand (1999), p 120.  
36 But note the assertion by James of an ‘apparent willingness by many law teachers 
to defer to the profession’: James (2004), pp 49–50; see also Keyes and Johnstone 
(2004), p 555 (academy’s ‘largely subservient relationship to legal practice’). 
37 James (2004), pp 58–59. 
38 James (2004), pp 58–59; the scope for influence is magnified with the entry of 
several law schools into a domain formerly tightly guarded by the practising 
profession, namely the provision of practical legal training. 
39 See generally Brand (1999), p 118. 
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school making curriculum changes without securing a professional imprimatur 
may risk disaccreditation.40 
Conversely there is a strong advantage in changes that could be seen as 
enhancing that ‘relevance’,41 and some law schools — in a nod to market 
forces — play that up to establish their distinctiveness.42 Recent national 
consultations with legal employers disclose that most are of the view that 
insufficient emphasis is given by the law schools to practice-related skills.43 In 
the language of the age-old debate about legal education, there is a spectrum 
from trade-school to ivory tower,44 and the pressures to move towards the 
former end are probably greater than at any time in living memory.45 Some 
might think it would be a good thing for law schools to provide more focus on 
what lawyers need ‘to be able to do’ instead of what they ‘need to know’,46 but 
those who became academics because they subscribe to traditional university 
values are likely to demur.47 
                                                          
40 See, for example, Legal Practitioners Admission Rules 1994 (NSW) r 44 (obliging 
law schools to give annual notification to the Legal Practitioners Admission Board 
of actual or proposed material alterations to the curriculum, with the Board then 
having the power and duty to approve or not approve the alteration and, if the 
latter, withdraw accreditation for the law degree). 
41 Another term frequently used in this context is ‘responsive’: see, for example, 
Sourdin (2004), p 65. 
42 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), pp 548–49. 
43 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 4; given the same authors’ observation that 
‘arguably the most significant of all of the developments in Australian legal 
education in the past decade is the focus on teaching legal skills within the 
undergraduate curriculum’ (p 133), one may well surmise either that this employer 
view is not well informed, or that law schools do not do (or are not able to do) as 
good a job at teaching legal skills as they claim. 
44 Framing the debate in this way is not intended to reject Jack Goldring’s thoughtful 
observations questioning the existence of a dichotomy between the ‘academic’ and 
the ‘practical’ in legal education: see, for example, Goldring (1987); see also 
Johnstone (1995). Indeed, the Australian Law Reform Commission was quite 
critical of the assumption that there must exist a rigid divide between academic 
legal education and professional legal training: Australian Law Reform 
Commission (2000), pp 138–42. 
45 James (2004), p 61 (and citing data taken from Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), 
pp 26–29) notes that 11 law schools explicitly identify themselves as 
‘professional’ law schools, or as oriented to the profession, and 13 emphasise their 
focus on practical legal skills. 
46 Australian Law Reform Commission (1999), p 46. 
47 See Varnava and Burridge (2002), p 12 and, trenchantly, Thornton (2004), 
pp 494–95, 501; the ideal position is perhaps found in the recommendation of the 
ALRC in its 2000 Managing Justice report: ‘in addition to the study of core areas 
of substantive law, legal education in Australia should involve the development of 
high level professional skills and a deep appreciation of ethical standards and 
professional responsibility’: Australian Law Reform Commission (2000), p 142. 
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Relations with Government 
Running through all of these developments is the ever-present impact of 
government policy. Governments want more people in university: they want 
fewer young people in the dole queue and they don’t want to have to justify to 
the electorate the expenditure of apparently large amounts of money on ‘elite’ 
institutions.48 In political discourse in the last 20 years, there have been a few 
unalloyed ‘goods’ and one of them is ‘more university places’.49 However, as 
Coaldrake and Stedman point out: 
The rapid growth in higher education in Australia was not a product of 
any acceptance by government of the civilising role of universities; it 
was always pragmatically based, vocationally focussed and sought to 
achieve its ends as cheaply as possible.50 
This ‘massification’ of higher education has not led successive Labor and 
Liberal governments to take responsibility for addressing the quality of the 
experience for those who fill the new places; rather, they have cut money from 
the system,51 especially since 1996.52 The exception has been a few exercises 
in auditing for ‘quality’, backed up by the arguably illogical ‘carrot’ of 
substantial grants to those who came out on top of each exercise. It is certainly 
arguable that the structure of the quality audit process gave the lie to any 
suggestion that the government was really taking responsibility for improving 
quality. Rather, as Clark and Tsamenyi argue: 
it must be recognised that what underlies much of the government’s 
‘quality’ response is the belief that governments should apply to 
universities the same managerial/corporate values which promote fee 
competition with the accompanied linking of input and output 
measures.53 
Quite possibly the real effect — if not the real purpose — of this kind of 
exercise is to challenge ‘traditional university values of independence and 
                                                          
48 See Karmel (2003). 
49 On the growth of higher education generally and of law in particular up to 1992, 
see McInnis and Marginson (1994), pp 11–15. 
50 Coaldrake and Stedman (1998), p 24. 
51 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 32; McInnis and Marginson (1994), pp 17–23; 
Coaldrake and Stedman (1998), p 176 (stating that there was a ‘thirteen per cent 
fall in discretionary teaching income per full-time student’ between 1985 and 
1998). 
52 This was the year that the ‘Vanstone cuts’ were announced: see Coaldrake and 
Stedman (1998), pp 22, 173. The authors point out that the cuts were greater than 
they appeared to be because of the government’s refusal to fund an overdue pay 
increase to university staff. 
53 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 37. 
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autonomy’.54 Paliwala suggests that such measures ‘have an impact on the 
freedom to teach as they constrain the teacher within approved forms and 
approaches to learning’.55 
As to the massification movement generally, it has enhanced the 
pressures, mentioned above, towards vocational models of education and away 
from the liberal: 
The existing system, in which a small elite received a liberal education, 
whilst the mass of ordinary people received at best a narrow ‘vocational 
training’ designed to adapt them to the existing industrial regime as 
disciplined and effective workers, had to be displaced.56 
As Brand indicates, from the 1990s on: ‘Law schools were no longer to 
be left largely to self-regulation, but were to be viewed as instruments of 
economic policy, to be assessed against benchmarks of community expectation 
and fiscal responsibility.’57 Thornton fears ‘the life of the academy [being] 
allowed to ebb away in favour of the one-way transmission of sterile 
technocratic knowledge in the interests of the market’.58 
Meanwhile, the government has asked students to make higher 
contributions to the cost of their education, setting the scene for the consumer 
mentality mentioned earlier.59 Nowhere has this been felt more keenly than in 
law, the only discipline positioned in the lowest funding band but the highest 
fee band. This has resulted in local students’ contributions to their course costs  
increasing from the 36.2 per cent it was prior to the introduction of differential 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) to about 80.1 per cent.60 A 
recent report commissioned by the state education ministers predicts that, 
under the new ‘HECS plus’ system, law students will pay 84 per cent of course 
costs.61 
The federal Liberal government sought to justify the treatment of law 
students under differential HECS by the unsupported assertion that law 
students make high salaries on graduation.62 While of course some do, ‘it is the 
occupational choices of students (a law graduate might choose, for example, to 
serve disadvantaged communities or work for a major corporate law firm) [that 
                                                          
54 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 43 (referring also to ‘demands for strategic planning 
[and] accountability’). 
55 Paliwala (2002), p 191. 
56 See Johnstone (1995). 
57 Brand (1999), p 115. 
58 Thornton (2004), p 502. 
59 The most direct impact of HECS increases on law schools has been to ‘alter … 
law student consciousness towards a consumer orientation’: Brand (1999), p 122. 
60 Karmel (1999), p 14. 
61 ‘Higher Fees Bring New World Order’, Australian, 28 July 2004, p 32 (citing a 
study by consultants Phillips Curran). 
62 Brand (1999), p 123 (quoting Vanstone 1996). 
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among other factors] determine the actual return to an individual’.63 
Accordingly, such an assertion risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
graduates who owe more money need to make higher salaries to pay their 
debts within a reasonable time, and graduate employment in the less 
remunerative fields of legal practice is, at least potentially, inhibited.64 This is 
bad news for at least three groups: those students who lack the inclination to 
go into higher-paid fields of practice,65 or who lack the personal attributes to 
make them attractive to employers in those fields;66 those people and causes 
who would have benefited from the availability of able and well-trained but 
modestly salaried lawyers; and academics who might have hoped to interest 
students in dimensions of law beyond the directly applicable and the 
mercantile. 
Summary 
It will be seen from the above discussion that there is a certain artificiality to 
separating the impact of students, the government and the profession in this 
context. Relations with one group are inevitably mediated by relations with 
one or both of the others. Our relations with students are influenced by 
government policy, which treats students as if they are our customers, and 
therefore encourages them to act that way in their dealings with us. Students’ 
expectations of law schools are conditioned by their perceptions of the needs 
of the profession.67 The under-resourcing of legal education by government 
drives law schools to regard the profession as an alternative funding source 
and inexpensive pool of legal expertise to supplement teaching and assessment 
needs, rendering law schools more susceptible to the profession’s expectations 
and vision of legal education. The resulting picture is one of law schools either 
starved of or scrambling for scarce resources, compelled to sacrifice sound 
educational objectives, critical inquiry and intellectual cultivation on the 
market-built altar of credentialism, careerism and pragmatism. 
From this perspective, there is a sense of helplessness, as if law schools 
are subject to a matrix of relationships between powerful players with very 
little scope to determine our own priorities and directions. We wait, in vain, for 
the injection of public funds and the changes in government policy that will 
dispose of the ‘lemons’. What if, however, we regarded ourselves also as 
                                                          
63 Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education 
Committee (2001), para 3.26. 
64 See Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 4.  
65 These tend to be commercially oriented fields: Vignaendra (1998), p 30. 
Subventions from law firms might tend to be concentrated in these areas as well: 
Bradney (1995). 
66 There is some evidence that mature-age women are particularly disadvantaged on 
this score: Vignaendra (1998), pp xxv, 111. Roper found that, among those law 
students graduating in 1997: ‘Male graduates tended to earn higher incomes than 
female graduates.’: Roper (2001), p 16. 
67 A focus group comment is instructive: ‘We are all really clued up about what 
employers want — we have to be.’: see Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 268. 
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players? Could we not be sufficiently flexible and imaginative to adapt to the 
environment and make it work for us, our students, the profession? There is, in 
our view, room for us, as legal academics, to have positive impact on the 
future of legal education. This article discusses some of the flexibility in the 
system that can work to our advantage. To continue the metaphor, we look at 
the ingredients that can be added to the lemons that will allow the lemonade to 
be made. 
The Sugar: Funding Teaching Innovation  
Not very long ago, it was common to hear complaints about the narrowness of 
the criteria applied in tenure and promotion processes, and in particular their 
restriction to research. Extra effort put into teaching — especially if it came at 
the expense of research output — paid few dividends. Quality in teaching was 
little valued. 
That has changed. There is enough evidence — in the form of changed 
tenure and promotion criteria, university and national awards for teaching 
excellence, the burgeoning scholarly literature on legal education (and journals 
that publish it) — to demonstrate the invigoration of teaching and learning in 
law schools.68 
A key initiative in the movement to emphasise teaching quality has been 
the funding of teaching innovation. Nationally, this commenced with the 
Committee for the Advancement of University Teaching, established in June 
1992 and succeeded by the Committee for University Teaching and Staff 
Development in 1997 and the Australian Universities Teaching Committee in 
2000. It continues with the Carrick Institute for Learning and Teaching in 
Higher Education, established in 2004. 
In some senses, teaching innovation funding is emblematic of the 
frustrations of university teaching in the 1990s. Following the funding squeeze 
and increases in student numbers, it was obvious that universities needed more 
funds to pay and support more teachers, just to maintain the quality we had 
previously been able to achieve. Therefore, many academics perceived this 
limited project funding to ‘advance’ university teaching as at best a band-aid 
solution and at worst a slap in the face. However, limited project funding was a 
logical extension from the thinking that gave us competitive research grants.69 
From the government’s perspective, such funding structures not only avoid 
some of the fiscal liabilities associated with organisational funding, but can 
also reinforce the ‘accountability’ message that was the electoral leitmotif of 
public administration during that period. Anything that required funded 
institutions periodically to go back to the government with a begging-bowl 
served to enhance the perception that these ‘elites’ were not being given 
privileged access to taxpayers’ money. Taking the universities down a peg or 
two in the name of teaching quality could be a rhetorical, if not an electoral, 
winner. 
                                                          
68 See generally Keyes and Johnstone (2004), pp 551–52 
69 See McInnis and Marginson (1994), pp 29–30. 
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When money is being taken out of operating grants and channelled into 
project funding, there is a risk that time will be wasted trying to fit ongoing 
needs into a project framework in order to claw back some of what has been 
taken away. As Coaldrake and Stedman point out, one of the ‘main drawbacks 
with any grant scheme [is] that it is hard to take a systematic approach which 
will have a major influence’.70 For those who wished to tap into this new 
source of funds, there was a real challenge associated with moving past the 
need for more ongoing teaching resources and conceiving new and better ways 
of doing things that could be supported by a one-off grant. 
Our experience has proved that this challenge is not insurmountable 
provided innovation is regarded as part of a larger process. In 2002, we 
received a grant from Flinders University to introduce a teamwork skills 
component in Constitutional Law. Previously lectures had been supplemented 
by weekly, one-hour, 15-person tutorials. These tutorials were abandoned in 
favour of fortnightly, two-hour, 30-person workshops in which randomly 
assigned, permanent groups of four to six students worked on past examination 
problems. The student contact hours did not change, but the doubling of class 
sizes represented a significant saving of staff time. Staff acted as roving group 
facilitators, aiming to spend a roughly equal amount of time with each small 
group, reviewing the group’s approach to the examination problems and 
answering their questions. A further saving of resources flowed from the 
replacement of the traditional mid-semester written assignment by a group 
presentation in the last round of workshops. Subject to variations in the event 
of serious freeloading, all members in a group received the same mark. This 
was justified because the primary assessment criterion was the quality of the 
group process evident. It is fair to hold all group members equally responsible 
for this. In sum, the project introduced a new teaching method (collaborative 
learning) to impart a new skill (teamwork) and thereby to conserve resources.71 
By aiming to conserve teaching resources, we came at the dilemma of 
project funding from a different angle: we asked for funding to set up a system 
that would make up for some of the effective loss of operating resources over 
preceding years. As far as this went, the project constituted a response to the 
governmental context of legal education. It was actually about teaching 
efficiency, or possibly an exercise in guarding against the loss of quality in the 
face of resource pressures and larger class sizes.72 It also was a response to the 
                                                          
70 Coaldrake and Stedman (1998), p 95. 
71 The project (including the steps taken to properly train students and cater for 
potential pitfalls), its evaluation and outcomes are described in full in Israel, 
Handsley and Davis (2004). Other examples of collaborative learning and/or 
teamwork in law include corporations law at the University of Western Sydney 
(see Sourdin (2004), p 66); the ‘Offices’ project at Griffith University (see Kift 
and Airo-Farulla (1995); Dick et al (1993); Godden et al (1994)); a project in 
Property Law at Monash University (Sifris and McNeil (2002); and a program to 
embed teamwork skills in the LLB at Queensland University of Technology 
(Burton (2003)). 
72 The idea for the project, together with a small amount of seed funding, had its 
origins in a funded investigation of increasing class sizes in universities: 
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professional context, improving teaching and learning via the introduction of a 
‘generic skill’ that is increasingly valued by law firms,73 but under-emphasised 
in legal education.74 Considering the status of these skills as another species of 
unalloyed good in the utilitarian world of modern higher education policy,75 
this must have been seen as a significant strength of our application. 
Returning to the efficiency dimension of the project, it is quite possible 
that this would have been sufficient motivation to do it even without the 
funding. Essentially the funding enabled us to do a better job, and it is 
primarily in this sense that we think it played much the same role as sugar 
plays in the making of lemonade. It made the exercise more palatable, 
particularly for the students. It also made the expenditure of (considerable) 
effort by the Constitutional Law staff seem more worthwhile. This is 
particularly so considering the existence of a funded and named project seems 
to add a good deal more to one’s teaching portfolio than an unfunded 
innovation would do. In this, our project and our experience have been very 
much of their time: they have been driven by educational impoverishment, the 
new emphasis on teaching quality in assessing academic performance and the 
pressure to make higher education ‘relevant’ to students’ future working lives. 
However, we see another, less cynical and less depressing, perspective on 
our activities. By including teamwork in the curriculum at the same level as 
legal research, oral advocacy, interviewing and drafting,76 we managed to 
strike a blow against the narrow vocational conception of the purpose of a law 
degree, starkly captured in the view some law students reported to Johnstone 
and Vignaendra that group work ‘interfered with “what the law degree should 
be about”’, being fundamentally opposed to their attitude that the study of law 
is ‘an individual pursuit, one done in competition with others … a pursuit for 
high grades, which would, in turn, “land” them either a highly competitive, 
lucrative or a prestigious job or [at least a job that would allow them to clear 
their education-related debts].’77 Contrast this ‘individualised and isolating’78 
vision of legal education with Gerry Johnstone’s advocacy for a broader 
purpose of making the student a better person: 
                                                                                                                               
Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Universities Teaching Committee, 
‘Teaching Large Classes Project’ http://tedi.up.edu.au/largeclasses/, described 
further in Israel, Handsley and Davis (2004), p 23. 
73 Bermingham and Hodson (2001). 
74 Johnstone and Vignaendra report that fewer than 20 per cent of student survey 
respondents agreed with the statement that team-building skills were being 
developed at law school: Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 249. 
75 That is, an unalloyed good to rival ‘more university places’: see n 49. On the 
utilitarian attitude to higher education, see n 54. 
76 All of these skills are expressly included in the Flinders curriculum and paired 
with a ‘substantive’ topic, thus Legal Method [Legal Research]; Administrative 
Law [Interviewing]; Advanced Contract [Oral Advocacy] and Corporate Law 
[Drafting]. 
77 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), p 273. 
78 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), p 542. 
120 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2005) VOL 14 NO 1 
University legal education should seek to promote personal 
development by cultivating knowledge and understanding, intellectual 
virtues, imagination, intellectual skills, self-reflection, moral virtues and 
habits, a capacity for social and political involvement, and a sense of 
responsibility for the values one espouses and the relationships into 
which one enters …79 
There is evidence that teamwork is important to legal practice,80 but 
learning it has an additional capacity to contribute to some of the personal 
development aims mentioned above.81 Placing students in groups gave them 
access to their peers as a resource in a way we had not seen for some time (see 
below). And, perhaps most importantly, the replacement of weekly one-hour 
15-student tutorials with fortnightly two-hour 30-student workshops divided 
into groups of four to six represented a shift to a better environment for 
students to engage actively with material, and take a deeper approach to their 
learning. 
The problem of finding ways to tap into teaching excellence project 
funding, in the early days at least, was exacerbated by the fact that the funding 
was not intended to support educational research — even if the research in 
question was a sine qua non of an improvement in teaching quality. The only 
obvious kinds of projects left that would require an initial injection of funds 
and then become self-sustaining were those centred around the development of 
materials or software. It took some imagination to move beyond that model. 
Our project combined some of the elements mentioned above: there was some 
research done on the significance of teamwork skills in legal practice and the 
foundations for collaborative learning,82 and some materials developed from 
the training literature for introductory sessions. Money was also spent renting, 
and eventually buying on video cassette, films that could demonstrate to 
students aspects of the teamwork process. Finally, and most importantly, the 
grant was used to relieve one of us (Israel) from some of his usual teaching in 
other subjects to act as a consultant, troubleshooter and evaluator in the 
introductory stage. 
Once again however it needs to be emphasised that this project required 
the commitment of substantial ‘normal’ staff time by those who are usually 
                                                          
79 Johnstone (1995). See also Bradney (1995): ‘Universities seek to provide their 
students with the intellectual means to make better choices about their lives … 
allowing the student to explore their humanity.’ Compare Wasserstrom (1984), 
p 158: ‘[law graduates] if educated soundly and well, would have and display a 
deep and abiding attachment to and concern for the moral worthiness and rightness 
of all that they do, of whatever they choose to do as lawyers, and a corresponding 
sense of responsibility for the justness and goodness of the legal system that their 
skills and training equip them to understand and to utilize.’ 
80 See, for example, Sourdin (2004), p 66; Weisbrot (1990), pp 254–58. 
81 See, for example, Reece (1998), p 20. 
82 For example, Reilly (2000); Dominguez (1999); Prince and Dunne (1997); Corcos 
et al (1997); Hertz-Lazarowitz (1992); Colbeck et al (2000); Palincsar and 
Herrenkohl (2002); Parsons and Drew (1996). 
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involved in the teaching of Constitutional Law. Happily the staff in question 
saw this as time well spent: in addition to the impact on one’s teaching 
portfolio, such an experience can provide sorely needed invigoration following 
a period of low morale. Finally, it is important to remember that this was a 
project that would save money and resources in the long run. 
The Water: Students as a Resource 
In the depressing (and at times threatening) atmosphere of higher education in 
recent years,83 it has been easy to see all the extra students in the system as 
nothing but vessels to be filled. Coupled with diminishing resources, this 
perception fuels an adherence to, or even impetus to return to,84 the traditional 
model of legal education, with its emphasis on the large lecture involving, at 
best, one-way transmission of knowledge. Often this now occurs without the 
mediating effect of discussion tutorials85 and the addition, by contrast, of 
intensification in the form of ‘block’ teaching.86 
In addition, the presence of more and more law students, especially in 
large classes, fewer tutorials and together for limited, concentrated periods of 
time, tends to inhibit or dilute the development of mutual support networks 
that would naturally come from day-to-day interaction between students. This 
is particularly so on a suburban campus (like ours at Flinders) where many 
students come for their classes and then leave again, without participating 
much in the social life of the institution. A recent report prepared for the 
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee states that the modern student spends 
more time in paid employment than his or her earlier counterpart:87 this 
contributes to a lower level of university presence and resulting attenuation of 
supportive relationships with other students. Another factor which can 
contribute to this effect is the diversity of the student body: where few students 
know each other from school (especially because they have been out of school 
for some years), where they commute from different parts of the city, are 
different ages and have different cultural backgrounds, social groupings do not 
form so easily. At Flinders, some students who are advised to borrow a 
friend’s notes from a missed lecture reply that they do not know anyone in the 
class well enough to ask.88 This can be contrasted with the positive comments 
that were made in the 1990s about the University of New South Wales' 
                                                          
83 See above section on ‘The Context of Legal Education’, particularly ‘Relations 
with Government’. 
84 Thornton (2004), pp 486–87; Johnson and Keyes (2004), p 552. 
85 Thornton (2004), p 486. 
86 Thornton (2004), p 484. 
87 See Long and Hayden (2001), p 13. 
88 This phenomenon is perceived as leading to an over-reliance on information 
technology to supplement non-attendance. The ‘lecture notes on the internet’ 
syndrome might in turn encourage non-attendance, and we need to ask at what 
cost to the quality of our teaching? See also Thornton (2004), p 484, who derides 
this ‘ultimate in efficient delivery, euphemistically dubbed “flexible learning”’. 
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‘powerful social climate’ and ‘unusually closely knit and egalitarian social 
community’.89 
It is not, however, necessary to see the large number of ‘insufficiently 
funded’ students as a burden and nothing else. A different view is to regard the 
students themselves as resources for effective teaching. The commonly 
advocated position for this is a setting where: 
the class can take the form of discussion and problem-solving, so that 
what the student has read is applied, reinforced, and consolidated. The 
student is able to put the more general theory into a context of specific 
applications, as well as learning to generalise from specific instances in 
a rational way. This is vastly better preparation for the learning 
activities that students will have to engage in throughout their working 
careers.90 
Another illustration of students being a resource for each other’s learning 
(in the experience of two of the present authors) was found at the University of 
New South Wales in the 1980s, with upper-year students often having the 
option to fulfil part of their assessment by way of a moot. Students would work 
together on a problem and their mutual interdependence (along with the 
impending trial by performance) would provide high motivation and, typically, 
a greater commitment of time and effort than would be given for a traditional 
written exercise. 
It would be unrealistic to aim for such practices in the current educational 
environment for law students, as outlined above. Both assume the routine 
presence of (and financial resources supporting) small-size classes (for more 
about this, see below). In the first example, small classes are needed to allow 
the desired constant active and participatory learning in the classroom setting. 
In the second example, there would be an unrealistic burden of setting 
problems, scheduling, room booking, judging and so on if the number of 
students were too high. 
The challenge, if we are to concoct a drinkable lemonade, is to imagine 
other ways to foster relationships among students,91 and harness the resource 
that their number — daunting as it is — represents. While collaborative 
learning remains uncommon at law schools,92 it is known that students 
engaging with one another promotes effective learning93 and encourages a 
                                                          
89 McInnis and Marginson (1994), p 92. The second comment is quoted from a study 
of class size by Andresen from UNSW’s Professional Development Centre. 
90 Goldring (1993), p 164. 
91 Another interesting model for encouraging the development of peer support is the 
‘Metamorphosis’ project at the University of Western Australia: Allen and Baron 
(2001). 
92 Only slightly more than 20 per cent of respondents to a student questionnaire 
reported that ‘co-operative learning’ occurred regularly in their legal education: 
see Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), pp 253 [Table 10.5], 254. 
93 Dominguez (1999). 
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deep approach to learning.94 Our teamwork project, accordingly, tapped into 
students as a resource in a way in which the lecture–tutorial format cannot. 
One observable effect was that students were more likely to read in preparation 
for the lectures, possibly because they did not want to drag their group down 
by having an inferior understanding of the material with which their team was 
dealing. Coming to the workshops better prepared, they asked more 
sophisticated questions that made better use of the resource that academic staff 
represent: rather than leading them through the basic principles, staff were able 
to engage with students at a level of analysis more commensurate with their 
expertise.95 
It is interesting to reflect on this fact in light of Goldring’s observation 
that the traditional lecturer was ‘aloof, pompous, paternalistic, capable, 
capricious, knowledgeable and, above all, authoritarian’.96 This 
characterisation seems to link expertise with the more undesirable 
interpersonal attitudes that lead education to be teacher-centred rather than 
student-centred. Yet one wonders whether an academic’s expertise is 
genuinely engaged in teacher-centred environments. The experience in our 
teamwork project makes traditional lecturing look more like babysitting than 
like an activity befitting our expertise. 
Students also served as a better resource for each other. We forced their 
hand in one sense by deciding not to post any lecture materials on the internet 
for them — rather, we offered to email materials to individual students on 
request. We received very few such requests, but we frequently noticed 
students turning to fellow team members for copies of notes from missed 
lectures — this was observed both in class and over the WebCT discussion 
tool, where we established a separate, private discussion topic for each team. 
Naturally there were also the effects derived directly from students’ 
interdependence in team tasks, and in particular their need to work together to 
produce a presentation at the end of the semester. Since each small group spent 
only part of each workshop with a facilitator in attendance, they spent the rest 
of the two hours relying on themselves and each other. 
Water is a useful metaphor for law students in this context because it 
seems to be inexhaustible but is often taken for granted. As the most important 
substance for life to exist, it needs to be conserved and not wasted, even if it 
does exist in abundance. While water is not really a resource for itself in the 
way that students are a resource for themselves and each other, there are 
certain protective effects against evaporation to be achieved by keeping water 
in larger bodies. As a component of lemonade, water is at least as important to 
palatability as sugar is — and in our project the students were at least as 
important as the funding. Possibly more so: would you rather drink diluted, 
unsweetened lemon juice or a concentrated mixture of lemon juice and sugar? 
                                                          
94 See Baron (2002), p 129; Tang (1998), p 113. 
95 Israel, Handsley and Davis (2004), p 21. 
96 Goldring (1993), p 159. 
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The Squeezer, or What About Coverage? 
Conventional legal education has been driven by content.97 Any new method 
of teaching that affects coverage of material can be difficult to embrace,98 and 
this was so for us. Space was made in the lecture program for introducing 
teamwork as a skill and briefing students on presentation skills. Changing from 
weekly tutorials to fortnightly workshops meant that some material had to be 
dropped from the tutorial program. This might seem like educational 
vandalism to some. Others, noting that overloading students increases the 
likelihood that they will adopt a surface approach to learning,99 are not so 
focused on coverage as on things like depth, skill development and the 
provision of an environment where students are more likely to develop an 
interest in the material. We took the view that these latter aspects were more 
important than the question of whether this or that area of constitutional law 
was the subject of treatment in a tutorial, or indeed included in the course at 
all100 — a view reinforced by the recognition that, with the sheer volume of 
law that exists and its almost instantaneous availability, coverage is a 
‘perennial problem’ for virtually all law teachers, whatever methods of 
teaching are adopted.101 
Innovative approaches to course content in a given doctrinal area are 
made possible by examination of what place that area occupies in the 
curriculum, and why. In the case of Constitutional Law, that place is in the 
compulsory core. If we accept it is necessary to go beyond the Priestley 
benchmark for the ‘why’,102 that question is a little more difficult, and likely to 
vary from school to school. We take the view that the justifications for making 
Constitutional Law compulsory in our school are twofold: first, it can illustrate 
much about the interface between law, policy and judicial method that can 
extend understanding in other fields; and second, practitioners in a wide range 
of areas need to be able to spot certain kinds of constitutional issues — not 
necessarily solve them in great technical depth, but spot them, because many 
of them can crop up virtually anywhere. 
Having identified these justifications, it is natural for us to choose aspects 
of constitutional law that serve one and ideally both of them. Therefore we do 
not consider it necessary to go into great depth on the trade and commerce and 
                                                          
97 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), p 540. 
98 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), p 555; Anker et al (2000), p 137. 
99 See Baron (2002), p 129. 
100 Goldring considers that the profession tends to over-emphasise ‘content coverage’ 
to the exclusion of ‘the importance of the learning process’: Goldring (1993), 
p 166. That observation could be extended to many of our academic colleagues. It 
seems a similar tension exists between the UK professions and law schools: 
Varnava and Burridge (2002), p 7; see further the discussion in Keyes and 
Johnstone (2004), pp 545–46. 
101 Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), pp 343–44. 
102 It is clear that some law schools have chosen not to be limited by ‘Priestley’ in 
devising their compulsory core curricula: Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), 
pp 94–98. 
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corporations powers. These areas are fairly settled now, so we are unlikely to 
see many new issues cropping up in practice. Moreover, the absence of recent 
cases means these powers illustrate little about how the current High Court 
works. Other areas, such as the industrial relations power, are fairly contained 
and adequately covered in electives for those students who might want to 
practise in relevant areas. We consider it more important to cover matters such 
as inconsistency, freedom of interstate trade, and individual rights and 
freedoms: these are more like legal ‘wild cards’, in that they can arise in 
virtually any field of practice. External affairs and the races power are included 
for their ability to fulfil the first justification — that of illustrating the interface 
between law and politics. 
We emphasise that the results of this kind of reflective process will be 
different for different schools, possibly at different times. The point we wish to 
make is that if the process can relieve anxieties about coverage, it can take 
considerable pressure off both staff and students, and can free up time to 
engage in more student-centred activities. As Goldring has pointed out: 
At a time when basic legal encyclopaedias — such as Halsburys — run 
into 40 or 50 volumes, there is no possiblity that students — even those 
who wish to practise as barristers or solicitors — should learn all the 
law.103 
What we did with coverage was quite similar to what one does when one 
squeezes a lemon, which is to extract from the fruit the part that is essential to 
one’s project. It required close reflection on what we were trying to achieve in 
teaching constitutional law, and a willingness to jettison the parts that were not 
essential to that purpose. It also required a reconsideration of the assumption 
that students cannot learn something effectively without formal classroom 
instruction, and was assisted by the introduction of some alternative methods 
of helping students to work through material. 
For some of the material, we were able without much effort to provide 
detailed lecture notes, because that is how the lecturer concerned prepares his 
material. Without having to confront the question of whether reading the 
written lecture is the educational equivalent of hearing it delivered ‘live’, we 
could be fairly confident that access to the written lecture was at the very least 
a substantial start to supporting students’ learning. 
For other material, we made use of the quiz function on WebCT. Early in 
the semester, a short quiz on characterisation was set at 10 per cent of the 
overall assessment of the subject. Later, when the workshop program was 
winding down, lecture material on judicial power was supplemented by a self-
test quiz. The former quiz was fairly easy and designed more as a way of 
forcing students to start using WebCT and boosting their confidence with the 
material. The latter quiz was considerably more difficult, being intended to 
extend students’ thinking in the same way a good tutorial should. 
                                                          
103 Goldring (1993), p 162. 
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A further strategy was to adjust the examination format to include an 
essay component. The reasons for doing this are not all related to the 
teamwork project, and we might have wanted to do it in any event. However, it 
did have the attraction of taking the pressure off the tutorial program. This is 
because material to be assessed by essay does not require the same level of 
attention to doctrinal detail. An adequate understanding can be achieved by 
students who read the material carefully and attend a lecture, especially if that 
lecture works a sample question or two. This is what we did. 
The Tasting: Replicating and Improving Upon the Benefits of 
Small Class Sizes 
It has become an item of faith in law teaching in Australia that improving the 
quality of legal education virtually mandates that teaching take place in smaller 
classes.104 Briefly, here is why that claim is made. 
The small-class model of teaching is advanced as a means of engaging 
students in active learning,105 which in turn has a greater capacity to foster a 
deep approach to learning.106 Active learning can bridge the gap between 
‘skills’ and ‘knowledge’ (or their surrogates, ‘vocational’ and ‘academic’ 
training) by developing both in tandem. That is, students who actively 
construct their own knowledge are building higher-order thinking skills (such 
as analysis and critical evaluation) at the same time. Active learners are 
independent learners, and therefore more likely to have the flexibility to 
respond to the challenges facing them over their working life, possibly through 
a number of different careers. As Clark and Tsamenyi suggest: ‘In the future 
there will be a premium … on legal education which provides students with 
higher order, critical thinking skills.’107 Active learning is also more enjoyable, 
less likely to be perceived as a chore and more likely to be a satisfying process. 
An alternative way of describing the benefits of small class sizes is that 
they provide an environment in which student-centred learning can flourish; 
small classes can ‘provide a space that is much more amenable to student 
participation, to student/instructor and student/student interaction’.108 Goldring 
contrasts the authoritarian lecturers and exam-alone assessment of his own 
legal education, resulting in ‘some lawyers [being] almost entirely self-
taught’,109 with the capacity of small class sizes to help students: 
                                                          
104 For the purposes of discussion, this will be taken to mean classes of about 30, on 
the basis that the Pearce Committee used 30–35 as the cut-off for small groups: 
Pearce et al (1987), p 57. 
105 See, for example, Allen and Baron (2001). 
106 See Coaldrake and Stedman (1998), p 79. On the benefits of deep approaches to 
learning, see Goldring (1998), p 87 and sources there cited; Varnava and Burridge 
(2002), p 18 (‘more likely to produce learning that lasts’). 
107 Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), p 32. 
108 Anker et al (2000), p 104. 
109 Goldring (1993), p 167. This provides an interesting twist on the idea of ‘student-
centred learning’, with Goldring suggesting elsewhere that it happens ‘by default’ 
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to learn to understand and apply changing rules and practices, how to 
develop rational and telling criticisms of outmoded laws, how to 
conduct research independently, how to analyse fact situations, present 
arguments, and communicate and how to think creatively and 
laterally.110 
These learning outcomes are seen as desirable because they provide more of 
what lawyers need in practice, and what was not provided by traditional 
models of legal education. 
There can be no doubt that adherence to the small-group model of legal 
education made a significant contribution to the Pearce Committee’s 
favourable assessment of the degree offered by one of the model’s pioneers, 
the University of New South Wales.111 The model was adopted in the mid-
1990s at the University of Sydney Law School to underpin a change in culture 
that would ‘[optimise] a productive teaching and learning environment’112 and 
it has found favour elsewhere.113 Keyes and Johnstone have recently hailed the 
trend towards smaller class sizes as one of the two ‘most significant 
improvements to teaching and learning in Australian law schools since the late 
1980s’.114 
However, as noted above, creating and maintaining smaller classes have 
been and continue to be threatened by government resourcing policies. We are 
not the first to note the irony that the new wave of law schools in the early 
1990s, of which Flinders was one, were set up on a traditional lecture–tutorial 
model.115 At the very moment when the traditional model had been identified 
as a less effective means of teaching law, the sector succumbed to the call of 
the high-quality, cheap students a law school could attract.116  
Yet the newer law schools have done some of the most interesting things 
with law teaching in recent times: one need only look at the achievements of 
                                                                                                                               
when ‘law teachers have given … little thought to the learning process, and simply 
purvey information to the students’: Goldring (1987), p 111. 
110 Goldring (1993), pp 159–61; for a large selection of other academic voices on the 
motivations for and benefits of small-group teaching, see Johnstone and 
Vignaendra (2003), pp 297–306. 
111 Pearce, Campbell and Harding (1987), pp 227–28. See also Goldring (1993), 
pp 160–61. Two members of our innovation team had had extensive experience 
with this teaching model at UNSW: Davis taught there from 1981–89; Handsley 
was a student there from 1981–86 and taught there from 1988–90. 
112 Anker et al (2000), p 105. 
113 McInnis and Marginson list a ‘further expansion’ of the trend towards smaller 
groups as one of the overall impacts of the Pearce Report: McInnis and Marginson 
(1994), p 170; for a more recent snapshot, see Johnstone and Vignaendra (2003), 
pp 306–7 [Table 12.1]. 
114 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), p 552; see also Thornton (2004), pp 485–86. 
115 See, for example, Clark and Tsamenyi (1996), pp 20–21, 32; Brand (1999), p 119. 
But see contra Simmonds (1998), p 63. 
116 See Brand (1999), p 119. A similar perception appears to exist in the United 
Kingdom: see Bradney (1995). 
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Marlene Le Brun and others at Griffith,117 or of Jack Goldring and colleagues 
at Wollongong,118 to see that these were some of the most exciting places to be 
teaching in the 1990s.119 Part of that excitement came from the challenge of 
finding new ways to teach large classes more effectively without the resources 
that would be needed to move to the small-class model. 
Our teamwork project was designed to fit within this tradition. Rather 
than bemoan the lack of resources and the corresponding inability to teach in 
small classes, we were able120 to reproduce benefits that are claimed for 
smaller classes — interactivity, preparatory reading as the norm, supportive 
relationships among students. 
Further, our project improved upon the small-class model. The mere fact 
of smaller classes does not guarantee higher quality teaching, a deep approach 
or active learning.121 Any students who lack the educational background to 
enable them to get the most from small class sizes122 would naturally benefit 
from alternative or additional strategies to ease the transition. Moreover, it is 
entirely possible to deliver a boring and didactic lecture to a class of 30. 
Indeed, it is possible for traditional tutorials to degenerate into lectures. 
Smaller classes may facilitate the adoption of beneficial approaches for those 
who wish to do so, but they also risk engendering complacency. The smaller 
size of the class can become a substitute for genuinely engaging teaching. 
Collaborative learning workshops used to inculcate teamwork skills avoid 
these risks. The key difference is in the instructor’s role as a roving 
resource,123 rather than the focus of the learning experience. In this way, 
student-centredness is built into the structure of the learning environment, 
rather than relying on the efforts and willingness of both teacher and students. 
These are often the first casualties of difficult times,124 so the establishment of 
a collaborative learning structure can be seen as a form of insurance. The 
workshop structure leaves students to their own resources, with the instructor 
as back-up when ideas run out or as reassurance to confirm the correctness of 
an approach or conclusion. The very concept of ‘teams’ creates a closeness, a 
sense of cohesion and mutual purpose that is lacking in ordinary small-group 
discussion exercises. Also, the integration of teamwork as a skill requires 
students to identify and address situations where individual students are not 
prepared, not participating or not cooperating. Indeed, students are rewarded 
                                                          
117 See, for example, Kift and Airo-Farulla (1995); Dick et al (1993); Godden et al 
(1994); Le Brun and Robertson (1997). 
118 See, for example, Goldring (1993), pp 161–69; Greig (2000). 
119 Brand notes further that satisfaction tended to be higher amongst graduates of the 
newer law schools: Brand (1999), p 136. 
120 See fully Israel, Handsley and Davis (2004). 
121 See McInnis and Marginson (1994), pp 164–66; Goldring (1987), p 111; Paliwala 
(2002), p 192. 
122 Allen and Baron (2001), p 348; see also Varnava and Burridge (2002), p 17. 
123 See n 71. 
124 That is, time involving restrictions on resources and/or increases in student 
numbers: see above, ‘The Context of Legal Education’. 
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for doing so, because any steps taken to address such difficulties are evidence 
of good team process. In other words, students become the ‘police’ or 
‘enforcers’ of each other’s active, deep learning. They might well be better 
equipped for that task than academic staff. 
In summary, and as we have reported elsewhere (following an evaluation 
process which involved focus groups, an external facilitator and responses to 
questionnaires): 
there was considerable evidence that many students were able to share 
their individual experiences, develop group and conflict-resolution 
skills, achieve a higher level of understanding of many of the 
substantive concepts and a more positive attitude towards the topic. The 
topic convenor reported substantial changes in her relationships with 
students as she was able to concentrate on improving student high level 
understanding rather than providing grounding in basic concepts. 
Finally, given the current state of the tertiary sector in Australia, the 
School was particularly pleased to save a significant amount of money 
by adopting a less resource-intensive teaching model that also improved 
students’ generic skills and helped them create supportive peer 
networks.125 
Conclusion: A Refreshing Change 
Keyes and Johnstone conclude their recent article on the past and future of 
legal education by expressing hesitancy about their decision to publish. Their 
concern flowed from the belief that the substantial changes they were 
promoting would be met with claims of lack of resources and colleagues 
already overworked.126 We have our own hesitancy, because it hardly works in 
favour of receiving more public funds to attempt to demonstrate that quality 
legal education can be delivered in the current environment. On the other hand, 
we see no evidence to give us any optimism whatsoever that an injection of 
public funds into legal education is a realistic proposition. Accordingly, we 
prefer to look for means to turn to our advantage the factors that are currently 
at play within the system.  
The introduction of collaborative learning in Constitutional Law, we 
believe, has lessons for our academic colleagues beyond the desirability of the 
particular methods we adopted. While those methods carry particular 
benefits,127 especially the reduction in marking time when students are 
assessed in groups and the inculcation of a generic skill, the experience 
provides a broader example of how the strategic investment of time in 
planning teaching can ultimately help to relieve many of the pressures that 
have been making our lives more difficult in recent years. 
First, it can enable us to tap into some of the relatively new sources of 
funds. This provides not only appreciated resources, but a career boost — at 
                                                          
125 Israel, Handsley and Davis (2004), pp 25–26. 
126 Keyes and Johnstone (2004), p 564. 
127 Israel, Handsley and Davis (2004), pp 15–25. 
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least in those institutions which value teaching in career advancement 
processes. If teaching innovation is valued, funded teaching innovation will be 
valued even more highly. Nor need it detract (in the long run) from one’s pace 
of publication, but rather it might provide one with new material to write about 
and the interest to motivate one to do the writing. 
Second, the investment of time in teaching innovation can boost morale 
by invigorating the relationships that have been squeezed by growing numbers 
and shrinking resources. Moreover, it can transform relationships between staff 
and students to make them more cognisant of the reason many of us believe we 
are there: rather than leading students through the basic principles, as virtually 
any recent graduate could probably do, we can create environments that 
provide opportunities to engage with students over the more difficult aspects of 
the law. The trade-off between teaching and research time does not look so 
painful if we feel we are using our full faculties in our dealings with students. 
In short, teaching can provide us with some of the intellectual stimulation we 
wanted to get out of academic life and expected to find in research. 
Third, the transformation of teaching methods and structures often 
requires the examination of our beliefs about content coverage. Such 
examination can be generally beneficial. If overloaded students tend to opt for 
surface approaches to learning, it is in our interests to keep content down and 
use processes that can allow students to explore the material in depth. 
Coverage might be the last frontier of reflective practice in law teaching.128 
We started this article by painting a depressing picture of the lot of the 
modern academic, and have finished with something that might look, to some, 
improbably rosy. We are reminded of the character in a Kurt Vonnegut novel 
who described to a friend her vision of heaven: sunshine, manicured lawns and 
golf buggies. The friend commented that it sounded like the kind of place 
where people would drink a lot of lemonade. The character replied: ‘I love 
lemonade.’ 
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